|Liberate Public Schools
interests in lawsuits was made possible by reason of becoming able to legally present them through means such as the Judiciary Act of 1937. Thereby came the ability to convince the Supreme Court to revisit decisions of earlier dates and solve the legislative / judiciary conflict under the Constitution.
My work suggests that the chance of success of non-class constituents in ending class actions versus their boards of education will be possible also by their becoming able to legally present their separate interests. This work demonstrates their separate interests; how they were presented in the Carlin case by pro bono counsel; and how they can be presented by volunteer counsel or amicus counsel appointed by the court. Most important, it enables challenges to interpretations under outdated decisions asserted by the counsel for a favored class in support of judicial maintenance of racially discriminatory programs.
Justice Scalia asks what is to be done to restore democratic processes in the many hundreds of school districts where desegregation class actions are still pending at this writing forty-six years after Brown v. Board of Education.
We respectfully reply that an immediate, just answer lies with the trial courts in the lengthy pending class actions. They can see that counsel are available, as illustrated, for the non-class constituents, whose interests inherently, if not as baldly as in the Carlin case, are in conflict with their boards of education. For these independent counsel would not be encumbered by the concerns of board members in facing a determined opposition to any change in the status quo by attorneys for the plaintiff-class, with their deep-pocketed funding by civil rights groups and the ability to seek attorney fees against the district.
It is in the interests of justice in these class actions to present by counsel the separate interests of the non-class constituents, not only as they pertain to any type of racial discrimination, but also to their right to meaningful participation in governing the school district. Thereupon, by the motion of such counsel or the Court's own motion, both the plaintiff-class and the board of education in each appropriate case can be ordered to show cause why the Court's jurisdiction should not be terminated and the democratic processes restored to the people in the respective school districts.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
|Carlin||Board of Education v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App.4th 411 (Feb.1998)
[conclusion of Carlin v. Board of Education]
San Diego, California
|— Liberate: Conclusion, pages 125 - 127 —|