Liberate Public Schools
from Government by Lawsuit / Phase Four
Again Seek End of Court Jurisdiction
Second Motion to Terminate Jurisdiction
On April 6, 1992, Intervenors filed motions to terminate court jurisdiction with a memorandum in support, relying strongly upon Dowell and Freeman, supra.
On May 20, 1992, in reversal of its 1981 position, the Board filed an opposition with a declaration by its Controller in support. Intervenors replied that the Board's only real objection was that the end of Court supervision could result in some loss of state integration funding; that this was based upon speculation; and in any event was not a legal basis for abdication of Board's jurisdiction.
The Carlin Class also opposed termination of the case arguing, first, that Board had not yet fully complied with the Writ of Mandate issued in 1977, to which Intervenors reiterated that both they and the Board had shown compliance with the writ in 1981, and argued there since had been continuous compliance.
The Class, second, argued that Intervenors should withdraw from the case since mandatory school assignments had not been sought by the Class since the 1982 Crawford III ruling. To this later point, Intervenors replied this same ruling eliminated any legal basis for race balancing as sought by the Class, and emphasized that the existing judgment sanctioned race balancing by this provision:
|Carlin||Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
|Crawford III||Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education,
458 U.S. 527 (1982)
Los Angeles, California
|Dowell||Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl. City Public Schools,
(10th Cir. 1989), 890 F.2d 1483
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
|Freeman||Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992)
DeKalb County School System (DCSS),
DeKalb County, Georgia
|— Liberate: Phase 4, pages 57 - 68 —|