implicitly since its end. It is instructive to learn of the judicial “supremacy” issue considered carefully by Justice Jackson in his book, as a guide to enable school district non-class constituencies in California and through-out the country to deal with continuing court jurisdiction in class actions adversely affecting them.

Justice Jackson describes an exploitation of judicial power in his book whereby lawyers bent on destroying legislation by Congress “used sharp legal devices to test constitutionality” (p. 118):

One of these was the procedure by which a stockholder would use his company to enjoin it from obeying the law. Of course neither of them wanted to obey it, and in that neat way they had a lawsuit in which both sides wanted the same thing. There was no real issue between them; the “issue” between them was only feigned, and the apparent adversaries were not in real controversy. They framed the issues to suit themselves. At that time even though such an action threatened to set aside an act of Congress, the Government could only be heard as a matter of grace. That was remedied (by the Judiciary Act of August 24, 1937) — but not until after the court fight.

This example is analogous to the joining of two parties in Carlin to secure state integration funds to continue a program adverse to the exercise of the legislative rights of non-class constituents of the Board, whose voices were able to be raised only under the most difficult circumstances.

In Carlin, an early deference by the Board to the judicial power over the District asserted by Plaintiffs came when the Board reversed its earlier attempt to terminate court jurisdiction and joined Plaintiffs in 1985 in supporting a “Final” Order continuing that jurisdiction with objectionable provisions. As noted above, one provision sanctioned the racial assignment of students to particular classes and seats within classes.

The Board accelerated that support by joining with Plaintiffs continuously from 1992 in opposition to discontinuance of court jurisdiction. This opposition continued, even after the trial court determined jurisdiction should end on July 1, 1998, until the Court of Appeal ruled against a petition by the Board and upheld the trial court's ruling.