of the public addressed the Board. Of those speakers, 50 were supportive of the integration program and six were in opposition.

Earlier, on June 12th, the Board's counsel advised that the Court had granted a continuance for the hearing on the final order to July 26; opening papers being due July 14, with seven days to reply.
 

On July 11, 1996, Groundswell filed its Memorandum re: Determination of Final Order. I stressed that our position had been presented to the Court and counsel in memoranda filed on March 19 and May 15; and to the Board on May 23 and 30, 1996. I complained, lacking any response, every indication was that of resistance. Accordingly, “Groundswell ha(d) no alternative but to reiterate its basis for modifications, and propose a decision and order requiring the plan for the forthcoming school year be accordingly modified.”

I first reviewed our March 19 and May 15 briefs.

I then cited Section 7A, Article I of the California Constitution as requiring our proposed modifications, under the facts and law at this time, citing Crawford II (1980), Crawford III (1982), Dowell, (1991), Freeman (1992), and Jenkins (1995). I then reiterated the aspects of the integration program presented earlier to the other parties as unconstitutional; why the Court should so conclude, order them discontinued forthwith and thereupon discharge the writ of mandate. These aspects were also presented to the Board by Groundswell's president on May 30.

I asked the Court to find the following facts and to conclude (for reasons given earlier but not repeated here) their implementation should be discontinued as unconstitutional:

FACT NO 1: The “assignment of students to particular seats and to particular classes solely because of race.”

FACT NO. 2: The assignment of students under a basic rule “that the percentage of students must not deviate more than plus or minus 20% from the proportion of White students in the