Liberate Public Schools
from Government by Lawsuit  /  Phase Four
  
64
Groundswell Intervenors
Again Seek End of Court Jurisdiction
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having jurisdiction by any interested person, be modified to conform to the provisions of this subdivision as amended, as applied to the facts which exist at the time of such modification.

Amicus reiterated the points of Intervenors and emphasized prophetically from a legislator's point of view the unconstitutionality of race-balancing occurring in the Defendant's plan. He argued that non-class constituents in the District were denied the democratic rights available to their counterparts in Los Angeles and other districts not under court supervision. He further noted this was a district absent a constitutional violation on its part, without which federal decisions had held there is no basis for assigning students on a racial basis, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), 402 U.S. 1 at 28.

Amicus argued in this district, there was no basis for extended court supervision to achieve racial balancing, quoting Justice Scalia, in concurrence in Freeman (1992), 112 S.Ct. 1430, at 1450-51:

The District Court in the present case found that the imbalances in student assignment were attributable to private demographic shifts rather than governmental action. Without disturbing this finding, and without finding that revision of student assignments was necessary to remedy some other unlawful government action, the Court of Appeals ordered DeKalb County to institute massive busing and other programs to achieve integration. The Court convincingly demonstrates that this cannot be reconciled with our cases, and I join its opinion....

Almost a quarter-century ago, in Green v. School Bd., New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-438...(1968), this Court held that school systems which had been enforcing de jure segregation at the time of Brown had not merely an obligation to assign students and resources on a race-neutral basis but also an “affirmative duty” to “desegregate,” that is to achieve insofar as practicable racial balance in their schools. This holding has become such a part of our legal fabric that there is a tendency, reflected in the Court of Appeals opinion in this case, to speak as though the Constitution requires such racial balancing. Of course it does not: The EqualNext
 


Brown I Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Topeka, Kansas
 
Green Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
New Kent County, Virginia
 
Swann Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971)
Charlotte, North Carolina
 
Freeman Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992)
DeKalb County School System (DCSS),
DeKalb County, Georgia
  
  Liberate: Phase 4, pages 57 - 68 — Previous Next
  

Liberate Public Schools
from Government by Lawsuit

A Long Pro Bono Struggle
Against Racially Balancing Public School Students
in a Thirty-Year Lawsuit
by Elmer Enstrom, Jr.
  
Contents
A chronological presentation of the 30-year Carlin affirmative action lawsuit:
a legal battle to reassert the "separation of powers" concept
of a republican form of government embodied in our Constitution.
  
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