In its supplemental memorandum, Defendant cited the granting of certiorari on September 26, 1994, in Jenkins, U.S. Supreme Ct. Docket No. 93-1823, 63 U.S.L.W. 3211, noting:

Although it is unclear what action the United States Supreme Court will take in this case, some observers have speculated that the Court could use Jenkins to affirm the use of education quality standards in assessing integration success, or to clarify the limits of a desegregation order. See Law School News, Vol. 22, No. 20, October 7, 1994 at p.1.

Defendant supplied the Court with the case of Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993) and highlighted certain portions of the circuit decision which I felt were offered in support of continued jurisdiction in this case. I disputed this construction as part of a continuous effort to apply rulings to this case arising from findings of de jure segregation and the need to rectify it.

Rulings in cases such as Jenkins did not, I urged, constitute a basis for denial of termination because that case like Freeman, supra, pertained to whether there remained the vestiges of past de jure segregation. For this case, I concluded, lacked such a finding to which the Defendant and Plaintiffs both had stipulated on June 22, 1981.

Fate intervened to postpone argument upon my points until after the Supreme Court's reversal of the Circuit Court in Jenkins, supporting our position in a broader way.

After mailing my motion to Court and counsel on October 28, my son Bob took me to Los Angeles. There son James took me to a round of doctors the following Monday and Tuesday for examinations of my knees and arthritic condition.

To make a long story short, after submitting my declaration, along with that of my doctor, the Court granted a continuance of my motion to January 13, 1995 for resetting (ultimately placing it off calendar). Following that, my boys took me to see a surgeon in San Diego, where he