The Carlin Plaintiffs filed another notice of appeal, dated October 28, 1981, from the 1981 order because, as before, it did not contain a mandatory reassignment segment for the following school year. I like to think our objections to busing in the trial on Intervenors' complaint were influential, although the grounds offered by the Court for the omission of a busing segment were not on the basis of our objections.

An appellate court will sometimes decide a case upon broader grounds than those raised below, as the Warren Court did in Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, on certiorari from the Supreme Court of Delaware. See Brown I; fn.1. But since a higher court might not overlook a failure to appeal on the broader points raised by the “Groundswell” group, who were now intervenors, I filed a cross-appeal on November 9, 1981 to preserve those points.
 

In March, 1983, following a period in which the Defendant Board had secured a series of extensions of time for the filing of its brief on the Carlin Plaintiffs' appeal from the October 2, 1979 appeal, all pending appeals were dismissed or abandoned. The extensions had been granted awaiting the decision on the challenge by Carlin co-counsel to Proposition 1, the constitutionality of which was upheld by Crawford III on June 30, 1982.

But this disposition did not eliminate the threat posed by a plaintiff-class dedicated to race balancing, per its definition, which continued to be achievable in this class action as long as the trial court retained jurisdiction over the District.

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling did not deter the Carlin Plaintiffs' effort to attain racial balancing of San Diego schools before the Carlin Court. This was evidenced by their motion in early 1983 to restrain the Defendant Board from proceeding with a 6th Grade Camp Program because it wasn't racially balanced. On February 21, 1983 in their Contention of Intervenors re: Motion of Plaintiffs to Restrain