under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this discussion amici argue that the language, purpose and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the passage of the Proposition bring it well within the Supreme Court's parameters concerning the invalidity of racially motivated legislation that, in fact, has a racially discriminatory impact.

Amici further argue that the retroactive feature of the Proposition, in purporting to allow the reopening of final judgments "whenever rendered" seeks to take away vested rights of the minority students attending minority segregated schools, including these very amici, an effort which must fall before the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amici likewise argue that the Proposition falls before the Fourteenth Amendment because in seeking to confine the Courts to the facts as they exist at the time "any interested person" decides to take it upon him/herself to reopen old judgments, the Proposition runs afoul the federal law on the subject and therefore is invalid under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2) of the United States Constitution....

We move ahead temporarily to June 29, 1982, when the United States Supreme Court rejected all the arguments ultimately presented by the Crawford proponents, in upholding the constitutionality of Prop. 1 in Crawford III. Excerpts from that opinion, (omitting footnotes) relating pertinent history, (458 U.S. 527, at 532) follow:

Following approval of Proposition 1, the [Los Angeles] District asked the Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied the District's application. The court reasoned that Proposition I was of no effect in this case in light of the court's 1970 finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court