state to force Miss Brown — solely because of her race — to go to a particular school to achieve the racial attendance thought socially desirable at that time, how can it be constitutional for the courts to force their children — solely because of their race — to go to a particular school to achieve the racial attendance thought socially desirable at this time?

Such requirements have come about by the extension of the Brown case by the courts to requiring "affirmative action" to remedy what has been called racial imbalance where they found it had occurred by what was called de jure (by law) segregation. The so-called remedial steps have come, not through the democratic process, but through the courts, whose decrees, backed by force or the threat of force, have called for busing.

Then, with the recent events in the "desegregation" trials then in process in Los Angeles and San Diego in mind, I noted further expansion of judicial power beyond that of the federal decisions by the California high court:

In 1976, the California Supreme Court in Crawford vs. Board of Education declared that school boards in California have a constitutional obligation to undertake reasonably feasible steps to alleviate racial segregation in schools, regardless of the cause of such segregation. It declared further that a court is not precluded from requiring busing of children as part of a "reasonably feasible desegregation plan."

Thus, forced busing can be brought about in San Diego under the California Supreme Court rulings, even though the U.S. Supreme Court in a late decision (Austin Independent School District case) stated large scale busing is permissible only where the evidence supports a finding that the extent of integration sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school